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At the start of his 1977 Lessing Prize address, the Auschwitz survivor Jean
Améry reflected on the declining reputation of the Enlightenment and
asked, ‘What sad aberration has brought us to the point where modern
thinkers do not dare to employ concepts such as progress, humanization, and
reason except within damning quotation marks?’ He placed the blame on a
‘brilliant work’ by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of Enlight-
enment:1 ‘In their effort to rescue the classical Enlightenment from the
naïveté determined by its epoch and to develop it further dialectically, the
authors let themselves be carried away and made horrendous claims
that, taken literally, could serve as an alibi for the very worst kind of
obscurantism’.2
In his brief but pugnacious book, Stephen Eric Bronner sets out to save
the Enlightenment from Horkheimer and Adorno’s botched rescue
mission. Their work, he maintains, is largely responsible for the neglect of
the ‘political legacy’ of the Enlightenment among ‘progressive activists and
intellectuals’ (p. x). He argues that, because they failed to appreciate ‘the
democratic inheritance of the Enlightenment’, all they could offer as an
alternative was a ‘metaphysical subjectivism’ that turned away from ‘any
systematic concern with social movements and political institutions’.
Reclaiming the Enlightenment aims at recovering this neglected political
dimension of the Enlightenment and thus ‘to provide the sequel that
Horkheimer and Adorno never wrote in a style they refused to employ’
(pp. 4–5).
It is possible that Bronner overestimates the impact of Horkheimer and
Adorno’s staggeringly difficult book. As David Hollinger has noted, a ques-
1 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, London,
Allen Lane, 1973.
2 Jean Améry, Radical Humanism: Selected Essays, Bloomington, Indiana University
Press, 1984.
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tioning of the legacy of the Enlightenment was – before French postmod-
ernism scrambled the terms – one of the defining features of what used to be
understood as ‘modernism’.3 And, once the Enlightenment was cast in the
role of inaugurating what was now dubbed ‘modernity’, Michel Foucault,
Jacques Derrida, and Jean-François Lyotard (none of whom seems to have
had much familiarity with Dialectic of Enlightenment) probably did more than
Horkheimer and Adorno to darken the reputation of the Enlightenment
among academic leftists.
It is also easy to exaggerate the degree to which Dialectic of Enlightenment
was concerned with ‘the Enlightenment’ at all. Bronner is aware that
Horkheimer and Adorno had a rather elastic notion of enlightenment – in
a letter to his friend Friedrich Pollock, Horkheimer traced its origins to
‘the first thought a human being conceived’ – and describes the book as
‘concerned with criticizing enlightenment generally, and the historical
epoch known as the Enlightenment in particular’ (p. 3; see also p. 96).4
But it might be more accurate to say that Dialectic of Enlightenment is prin-
cipally concerned with ‘enlightenment in general’ and, occasionally, with
the historical period known as ‘the Enlightenment’. Horkheimer may origi-
nally have had a more limited target in mind: Herbert Marcuse – who
briefly worked on the book before being replaced by Adorno – seems to
have thought that Carl Becker’s The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century
Philosophers would be relevant to the project.5 But in the book that Horkhe-
imer wound up writing with Adorno, explicit discussions of eighteenth-
century figures are scarce – for the most part they are confined to an
excursus on Kant and Sade – and tend to be lost in a cast of characters that
stretches from Oedipus and Odysseus through Francis Bacon, Friedrich
Nietzsche and Sigmund Freud, and onward to Greta Garbo, Donald Duck
and Adolf Hitler.
Horkheimer and Adorno’s ultimate target was nothing less than the
conception of rationality they saw as dominating the modern world. While
Jürgen Habermas countered their argument by suggesting that modern
rationality is not quite as impoverished as Dialectic of Enlightenment would have
us believe,6 Bronner pursues a different tack. Arguing that an assessment of
the legacy of the Enlightenment must ultimately turn on ‘historical justifica-
tions’ rather than ‘metaphysical claims’ (p. 98), he intends to offer an
3 David Hollinger, ‘The Enlightenment and the Genealogy of Cultural Conflict in
the United States’, in K. M. Baker and P. H. Reill (eds), What’s Left of Enlightenment? A
Postmodern Question, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 2001, pp. 7–18.
4 Max Horkheimer, Gesammelte Schriften, edited by A. Schmidt and G. Schmid
Noerr, Frankfurt am Main, S. Fischer, 1985, 19 vols, vol. 17, pp. 446, 3; see also p. 96.
5 Ibid., p. 241.
6 Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, Studies in
Contemporary German Social Thought, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1987.
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account that examines the ‘actual movements with which enlightenment
ideals, as against competing ideals, were connected’. Any discussion of the
Enlightenment that ignores this ‘political history’ will, he argues, ‘necessarily
take a purely academic form’ (p. 6).
Setting himself against what he dismisses as ‘current fashions and con-
ceits’ (p. 10), Bronner has little interest in recent scholarship on the Enlight-
enment. He argues that studies exploring differences between ‘diverse
national, religious, gender, generational, and regional “enlightenments” ’
turn the Enlightenment into a ‘dead historical artifact’ and lose sight of its
‘unifying cosmopolitan spirit’ (pp. 10–11). While he grants that it may have
been legitimate for Jonathan Israel and Margaret Jacob to distinguish
between ‘radical’ and ‘moderate’ tendencies within the Enlightenment,7 he
suggests – somewhat cryptically – that such distinctions are ‘better done in
hindsight’ (p. 9). He takes ‘academic historians’ to task for being overly
concerned with the various ‘internal debates’ that divided Enlightenment
thinkers (p. 11) and chides Robert Darnton for focusing on ‘the resentment
of its lesser known against its more famous representatives’ rather than
exploring what Bronner sees as the central point: ‘the political conflict
between the Enlightenment and the Counter-Enlightenment’ (pp. 11–12).
Reclaiming the Enlightenment, he announces at the outset, ‘has no intention of
pleasing the narrow specialist in any particular field’ (pp. 5–6).
Measured against that intention, it is likely to succeed. The book is
plagued with errors, both small and large. Losing his way in The Portable
Enlightenment Reader, Bronner credits Voltaire’s famous portrait of the Royal
Exchange – that place where ‘the Jew, the Mahometan, and the Christian
transact together as though they all professed the same religion’ – to one of
Voltaire’s letters to Frederick the Great (p. 43). One can only hope that it is
not just ‘narrow specialists’ who know that the quote comes from Voltaire’s
Letters Concerning the English Nation. Bronner claims that Kant ‘retracted his
support’ for the French Revolution when the Terror began (p. 57). But,
while Kant may have condemned the execution of Louis XVI, he nevertheless
remained – much to the consternation of his more conservative friends –
steadfast in his defence of the Revolution.8 As evidence of how the philosophes
put aside their differences and closed ranks in the face of a common threat,
Bronner hails their opposition to ‘the attempt to censor Diderot’s Encyclope-
dia in 1786’ (p. 69). But by 1786 the possibility of censoring the Encyclopedia
7 Jonathan Irvine Israel, Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Moder-
nity, 1650–1750, Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 2001; Margaret C.
Jacob, The Radical Enlightenment: Pantheists, Freemasons and Republicans, London,
Allen & Unwin, 1981.
8 Manfred Kuehn, Kant: A Biography, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
2001, pp. 340–3.
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had long passed (it had been in print for about 15 years and Europe was
flooded with pirate editions) and a fair number of the philosophes (including
Voltaire, Helvétius, Condillac, Diderot and D’Alembert) were dead. Olympe
de Gouges is cited as an example of the commitment of the Enlightenment
to a ‘uniquely modern understanding of democracy’ (p. 58), yet it was her
continued defence of the monarchy that led to her execution during the
Terror. Bronner assures us that ‘most philosophes considered religious faith
nothing more than superstition’. The generalization holds only if we ignore
the efforts of John Toland, Joseph Priestley, and others to distinguish what
they took to be the rational core of Christian teachings from the web of
superstitions that were the product of what Toland called ‘the craft of phi-
losophers and priests’. Bronner may have little respect for ‘narrow special-
ists’, but it is surprising that a major university press would publish a book on
the Enlightenment that apparently escaped review by a reader acquainted
with the period.
The ‘political history’ of the Enlightenment that Bronner offers as an
alternative is also rather problematic. He argues that the ideals of the
Enlightenment originated in the ‘expression of a bourgeois class on the rise
against the hegemonic feudal values of the established society’ and were
subsequently taken up by ‘liberal and socialist forces’. These ideals met with
opposition from the ‘forces of religious reaction, conservative prejudice, and
fascist irrationalism whose inspiration derived from what Isaiah Berlin ini-
tially termed the “Counter-Enlightenment” ’. Locked in a battle that has
raged ‘from 1789 until 1939 and into the present’, the struggle between these
two camps comes to a head in ‘the epic battle that would culminate in
Auschwitz’ (pp. 6–8).
As a gripping tale of the struggle between the forces of good and evil,
Bronner’s story may have its attractions. But it rests on characterizations of
the Enlightenment that have long ago been called into question. The more
we learn about the social context of the Enlightenment, the harder it is to
see the movement as the product of ‘a bourgeois class on the rise’; it flour-
ished thanks to friends in monarchy (could the Encyclopedia have been pub-
lished without the help of Malesherbes?) and aristocrats with an interest in
new ideas (salonnières, for example, tended to be women of considerable
means); we also find a fair number of abbés in its ranks. Misunderstanding
the argument of Darrin McMahon’s nuanced discussion of how the image
of an anti-monarchical, anti-clerical and socially radical Enlightenment was
fabricated by Catholic critics of the philosophes,9 Bronner takes these fanta-
sies as evidence for the radical challenge that the movement posed to the
old regime (p. 11). While McMahon (whose name Bronner misspells)
9 Darrin M. McMahon, Enemies of the Enlightenment: The French Counter-Enlightenment
and the Making of Modernity, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001.
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stressed the differences between the opponents of the philosophes he studies
and the group of thinkers that Isaiah Berlin assembled together under the
label ‘Counter-Enlightenment’,10 Bronner treats thinkers as diverse in their
philosophical, confessional, and political allegiances as Johann Georg
Hamann, Joseph de Maistre, and Martin Heidegger as members of a single
tradition (pp. 63, 75–6). Yet it is not just ‘Enlightenment’ that has begun to
appear in the plural: the same thing has happened to ‘the Counter-
Enlightenment’. As Graeme Garrard argues in an insightful survey of the
concept, ‘The Counter-Enlightenment, understood as a single movement, is
a fiction, and not a particularly useful one at that. There were – and are –
many Counter-Enlightenments.’11
The legacy of the Enlightenment is a good deal messier than Reclaiming the
Enlightenment would have us believe. To argue that liberalism was ‘the prin-
cipal political theory of the Enlightenment’ (p. 41; see also p. 155) and to see
‘the Counter-Enlightenment’ as rabidly anti-liberal overlooks the fact that a
fair number of enlighteners embraced a paternalistic conception of the state
that had little in common with liberal conceptions of politics and that at least
some of the thinkers consigned by Berlin to the ranks of the Counter-
Enlightenment were decidedly liberal in their political views (e.g. Friedrich
Heinrich Jacobi was a major influence on Wilhelm von Humboldt, whose
work, in turn, had a decisive impact on the argument of Mill’s On Liberty).
More generally, the picture of liberalism and socialism as the heirs of the
Enlightenment’s legacy (pp. xii, 42, 65, 158) ignores the degree to which
both were informed by traditions – for example, Romanticism – that have
typically been associated with the Counter-Enlightenment. Indeed, it is hard
to see how Berlin’s own robust defence of liberalism can be separated from
his devotion to those ‘Counter-Enlightenment’ thinkers who, according to
Bronner, were laying the foundations for the totalitarian state.12 Finally, there
are at least some conservatives who see themselves as the descendants of
Adam Smith and Edmund Burke rather than Joseph de Maistre and Louis
Bonald: Bronner’s attempt to reclaim the Enlightenment for the left has now
been joined by Gertrude Himmelfarb’s effort to do the same for the right.13
While Bronner may be correct that ‘Too much emphasis has been
10 See ibid., pp. 8–9, and Darrin M. McMahon, ‘The Real Counter-Enlightenment:
The Case of France’, in R. Wokler and J. Mali (eds), Isaiah Berlin’s Counter-
Enlightenment, Philadelphia, American Philosophical Society, 2003, pp. 92–3.
11 Graeme Garrard, Counter-Enlightenments: From the Eighteenth Century to the Present,
Abingdon and New York, Routledge, 2006, p. 4.
12 Graeme Garrard, ‘The Counter-Enlightenment Liberalism of Isaiah Berlin’,
Journal of Political Ideologies, 2: 3 (1997), pp. 281–96.
13 Gertrude Himmelfarb, The Roads to Modernity: The British, French, and
American Enlightenments, 1st edn, New York, Knopf, 2004.
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placed . . . on the connection between Enlightenment thinking and laissez-
faire economics’ (p. 155), it will probably take a stronger argument than this
to persuade the denizens of the American Enterprise Institute to shed their
Adam Smith ties.
Bronner has a relatively simple strategy for dealing with anything that
might complicate his account of the legacy of the Enlightenment. He con-
cedes that ‘Enlightenment intellectuals were not pillars of political correct-
ness’ (p. 65), that they were sometimes ‘elitist’ and exhibited ‘sexist and
racist prejudices’ (pp. 14, 33–4); he finds it ‘impossible to excuse Voltaire for
his anti-Semitism’ (p. 12). But none of this is allowed to complicate his final
judgement: while every member of the ‘the Counter-Enlightenment’ – from
Hamann to Heidegger – was paving the path that would lead to Auschwitz,
the failings of individual enlighteners are of no consequence for what he
terms ‘the enlightenment ethos’ (p. 14). Bronner’s brief discussion of Jacob
Talmon’s charge that Rousseau provided the philosophical support for
‘totalitarian democracy’ illustrates how simple it is to keep the legacy of the
Enlightenment unsullied. He argues that, even if it were possible to trace
such a legacy to Rousseau, then ‘this would vindicate his alienation from the
general liberal political tenor of the Enlightenment and suggest that the
treatment of him as an enemy by Voltaire and his friends was justified’
(p. 105). The argument is irrefutable – and hence empty: all Enlightenment
thinkers are liberal and tolerant and those that aren’t . . . well, they’re not
really part of the Enlightenment after all. Despite its author’s admiration for
Voltaire, there are passages in Reclaiming the Enlightenment that might have
slipped from the pen of Doctor Pangloss.
Settling disputed legacies is probably a job best left to lawyers, not histo-
rians, and it may be unfair to subject what is ultimately an exercise in political
rhetoric to the niggling standards of normal scholarship. Written in the wake
of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, it is perhaps understandable
that Reclaiming the Enlightenment tends to see the world in relatively simple
terms: on one side the forces of religious toleration, democracy, individual
liberty and human rights; on the other side, religious fanaticism, authoritari-
anism and tribal hatreds. Yet there is a case to be made – especially in difficult
times – for questioning legacies rather than simply banking on them. In a
badly mangled sentence (sadly, not the only one in a book that could have
profited from further proofreading) Bronner muses, ‘Strange is how the left
critique of Enlightenment, supposedly undertaken from the standpoint of
Enlightenment itself, should wind harboring [sic] affinities with the thinking
of right-wing irrationalists and neo-romantics’ (p. 124). But why should this
be so strange? What intrigued Isaiah Berlin about Hamann was his suspicion
that this bizarre, enigmatic, and untidy thinker might have understood
things about the role of language and tradition in shaping our access to the
world that Kant had missed. Something similar moved Max Horkheimer and
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Theodor Adorno to seek, in the ‘dark writers of the bourgeoisie’, a testimony
to the costs of progress that their more cheerful contemporaries were reluc-
tant to consider. The courage to entertain doubts about what counts as
enlightenment may be one of the more important legacies the Enlighten-
ment has left us.
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